Blogging Bataan

Some time ago I received a CD with a PDF copy of the memoirs of my mother's older brother who was captain of an anti-aircraft battery on Corregidor and was in the Bataan Death March. I've just begun reading it. He seemed kind of bitter toward the Army leaders and his fellow servicemen, but considering what he went through, and the way he and his men were abandoned when war broke out, I can understand it. There was no real reason that so many people had to die in the Pacific War, only incompetence and complacence of the military leadership.

On November 28, 1941 . . . the commander of the Harbor defenses of Manila and Subic Bays received a communication from [USAFFE] headquarters which stated that "a state of unlimited emergency exists, take all due precautions." The General's action was to order all units to take field positions and to maintain battle stations on a 24 hour alert status [by noon the following day].

It's natural, therefore, to wonder why nearly the entire Pacific Fleet was bottled up at Pearl Harbor 8 days later.

I can also understand why some of those left behind when MacArthur left for Australia might be kind of bitter toward his "superiors." MacArthur seems to have taken the attack on Pearl Harbor as less than a cause for putting his air forces on alert, so his fighters were mostly destroyed on the ground. The Coast Artillery had been on alert for at least a week. I doubt that he knew much or had any confidence in air power at that time.

More to come.

Update: My uncle's story is obviously based in part on his official written reports. He talks a lot about the guns in his battery and include how many rounds they fired each day. Some of it is familiar cliche about Army life. He catchs a Private asleep on guard duty. He takes his rifle and bayonet and holds a .45 pistol in his face as he wakes him up. No court martial. They spent five months under attack by the Japanese, the last month of which was under siege and almost constant bombing and shelling. His writing is pretty objective, he notes it when he gives an opinion, but generally he lets the facts do the talking. The Army had 14 Quartermasters' mules stabled on the Rock as they called Corregidor. On one-third rations and out of meat, they asked for permission to slaughter the mules for meat, since they weren't being used, and were subject to frequent wounds and fright from all the shrapnel and debris cast up by the shelling. "We thought it to be a very good idea to slaughter the mules and use them as a meat supply. Upon petition to the Quartermaster to do this we recieved a flat refusal. He must have been an old muleskinner." They did were allowed to slaughter the mules that had been critically injured, however.

After the siege began, he reports an incident I found revealing:

The Regimental Executive Officer came one day to inspect our position. He noticed that we had a great number of flies around our kitchen ara. He told me that I ought to do something about those flies, and to build fly traps for them. I would have had to trap the whole population of the mule corrall [sic] as well. [The corral was nearby.] I ask [sic] him what would I use for bait. He said that a can of salmon would be good bait. I told him that if we ever got a can of salmon in the battery we would eat it, not the flies. He said to come down to Malinta Tunnel and he would give me a can of salmon. That was real regimental help in the midst of the hell of war that we were experiencing.

I'm beginning to understand why there was so much resentment toward MacArthur. He was a big hero back at home, but when the war began, he basically refused to acknowledge it and lost most of the aircraft in the islands as a result. He wasn't one to share the hardships of his men, if you know what I mean.